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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO AWARD MARGEE FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF THE VALUE 
OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL PROPERTY AND THE 
APPRECIATED VALUE OF DUNE ROAD AND THE DUNE ROAD 
RENTAL ACCOUNT. 
A. The district court misunderstood or misapplied the law by failing to 
award Margee her presumed fifty percent (50%) share of the value of 
the parties' marital property. 
As mandated by our case law as cited in our opening brief, the trial court properly 
categorized the Marital Home and its by-products, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, 
together with the Park City Condo, as marital property. Having reached that point, it appears 
from the trial court's expressed guiding principles of law, that the trial court was aware that 
each of the parties was presumptively entitled to 50% of that marital property. (Add. B, f 
1 .b.). However, nowhere in the record is there any indication that the trial court understood 
that such presumption could only be ignored if there were "exceptional circumstances" that 
the trial court had to articulate. Instead, the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law 
by incorrectly following another of the trial court's guiding principles expressed as follows: 
Property acquired during the marriage with proceeds from 
separate property is usually considered pre-marital and not 
marital. (Add. B, If I.e.). 
It is the unjustified application of that last cited principle that makes the trial court's 
ultimate ignoring of Margee's 50% entitlement reversible. The whole dynamics of the case 
changed once the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the Park City Condo 
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were found and concluded to have been martial properties.1 In spite of that correct 
determination, opposing counsel, as did the trial court, continues to treat a substantial portion 
of those assets as separate, pre-marital properties. Such is apparent from the following 
references to Appellee's Brief: 
1. At paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts, without any citation, opposing 
counsel states: 
The parties agreed, prior to their marriage, that Chuck Hayes 
would continue his primary residential development business 
and, in doing so, this would provide a home for the parties. 
What the trial court really found is as follows: 
Just prior to their marriage, the parties agreed that after their 
marriage Chuck would continue with his real estate development 
business and provide a home for the family, and that Margee 
would continue to work as a flight attendant and provide steady 
income and valuable employment benefits for their family. 
(Add. A, t 36). 
There is an obvious dramatic difference in the two versions of the parties' agreement. 
2. At paragraph 11 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states "Similar to 
all his prior real estate projects, the Aerie home was titled in Chuck's name" thus implying 
that the Marital Home was not marital property. Such implication is directly contrary to the 
1
 The reason why we have not found it necessary to quarrel with the trial court's finding 
that Chuck's forgery of Margee's signature on the $300,000 Line of Credit secured by the 
Marital Home and Chuck's deeding of the Marital Home to her was innocuous, is because 
the trial court found and concluded that the Marital Home was marital property. Had the trial 
court found and concluded that the Marital Home was not marital property, then it would 
have been crucial for Margee to argue the effect of Chuck's forgeries and deeding of the 
Martial Home to Margee. That became unnecessary upon the trial court's determination that 
the Marital Home was marital property. 
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trial court's findings and conclusions that the Marital Home was marital property. (App. A, 
1f 67; App. B, | 17; App. C, p. 17; App. D, pp. 470, 473, 474). 
3. At paragraph 13 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states: 
The Court found . . . that it was fair and reasonable that both 
parties be awarded their pre-marital properties and contributions. 
(Citations omitted). 
The way the paragraph is written, it implies that the pre-marital properties and contributions 
at issue never became marital property, but the record makes clear that the properties at issue 
were marital properties. See paragraph 2 above. 
4. At paragraph 20 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel states in the 
introduction to such paragraph that: 
As of the date of trial, but before recognition of each parties' 
separate contributions, the Court found that the following items 
were subject to distribution by the Court: . . . . 
Note how opposing counsel has avoided characterizing the "following items" as marital 
properties, which they were. 
5. At paragraph 25 of the Statement of Facts, opposing counsel again avoids 
identifying the property at issue as marital property, calling it only "properly subject to 
distribution." 
6. At section I of the Summary of Arguments on page 7, opposing counsel states: 
The Trial Court correctly determined what properties were 
separate, which separate properties were contributed by each 
party toward the acquisition of marital properties, but maintained 
their separate character, and what marital properties were 
acquired. Appellant does not dispute those findings, nor does 
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she appeal from the trial court's determinations. (Emphasis 
added). 
Of course Margee disputes that what opposing counsel refers to as "separate properties" 
maintained their separate character. The only findings and conclusions in the record make 
clear that the properties in question became marital properties, and there is absolutely nothing 
to indicate that they were maintained or remained as separate pre-marital properties. 
According to the trial court's findings and conclusions, the separate properties at issue all 
became marital properties. Ignoring that proposition is why the trial court should be reversed 
for its failure to award Margee 50% of the marital properties. 
7. In the first paragraph of Argument LA. on page 8, opposing counsel states: 
By complaining that the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
unequally distributing the marital estate, Petitioner makes the 
conceptual and misleading mistake of comparing the valuations 
of the parties' pre- and post-separate estates, together with their 
marital estates. This is an indirect way of complaining that the 
District Court should not have held that the parties' separate 
contributions remained their separate contributions, a finding 
that petitioner neither objected nor appealed from. (Emphasis 
added). 
Such argument totally ignores the reality that Margee has compared the 50% value of the 
marital estate to the pre-marital separate property which the trial court found was no longer 
separate property. Again, nowhere in the record did the trial court determine that the separate 
contributions "remained" separate property. That is one of the bases on which Margee has 
appealed the trial court's failure to give her 50% of the marital property. In other words, even 
though there was never any determination that what was originally separate property 
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remained separate property, that is precisely what opposing counsel's argument erroneously 
assumes. That the trial court eventually acted as though the separate property was really 
separate property all along, contrary to its own findings and conclusions, is an obvious reason 
why the trial court either misunderstood or misapplied the law. 
8. At the first full paragraph on page 11, opposing counsel states: 
The parties and the court all agree that the gross value of 
property subject to distribution as separate and marital property 
in this matter consists of: 
1) The Aerie home, which was sold during the divorce 
proceedings, and the proceeds applied to the Little Kate 
lot worth $381,000, and $263,000 placed in escrow; 
2) The Park City condo worth $ 150,000; and 
3) Vehicles totaling $35,600. 
Total value of property to be divided: $829,600. (Emphasis added). 
Here again we find the unwarranted conclusion that the property described in such paragraph 
has both a "separate and marital" component. That is directly contrary to the trial court's 
findings and conclusions and serves to make the point again that Margee was entitled to her 
50% share of the marital property. Once it was determined to be marital property, it was no 
longer separate property. 
9. In section B. on page 12, opposing counsel contends as follows: 
By arguing that Margee is entitled to 50% of all property, . . . 
Petitioner disregards . . . that Chuck Hayes did not intend to deed 
the Aerie home as joint property, or to lose the separate character 
of his pre-marital contributions to that home. (App. Ad. B, R. 
841-842, fflf 14-16.). (Emphasis added). 
Such argument again incorrectly assumes that Chuck's pre-marital contributions did not lose 
their separate character when they became marital property. What Chuck intended is 
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irrelevant, because the trial court found that regardless of his intent, the Aerie home was 
marital property. See footnote 1 on page 2 above. 
10. In the final paragraph of such argument at the top of page 13, opposing counsel 
states: 
Clearly, the Court made significant, uncontroverted findings of 
separate, non-marital properties and contributions, which justify 
the Court's decision in extraordinary detail. (Emphasis added). 
To the contrary, with respect to the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the 
Park City Condo, the trial court did not make any findings or conclusions that what had 
previously been "separate, non-marital properties and contributions" did not become marital 
properties. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that opposing counsel has tried to evade the reality 
that the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the Park City Condo did not 
remain as separate properties, that they were all marital properties, and that there were no 
exceptional circumstances to justify the trial court's denial of an award to Margee of her 50% 
presumed share of those properties. 
Beginning with the last paragraph of page 11 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel 
cites Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) in an effort to support the trial court's 
error. Counsel first states that "Petitioner's methodolgy, however, has been specifically 
rejected by the Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall. . ." That is simply a misreading of Hall 
since the opinion clearly affirmed the presumptive 50% rule as follows: 
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In Burt v. Burt, 79 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), this court 
observed that trial courts must distribute property between the 
parties to a divorce in a fair, systematic fashion. The Burt court 
noted that the trial court should 'first properly categorize the 
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be 
entitled to all of his or her separate property and 50% of the 
marital property.' The Burt court continued: 
'But rather than simply enter such a decree 
[automatically], the court should then consider the 
existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any 
be shown, proceed to effect an equitable 
distribution in light of those circumstances. . . .' 
Thus, under Burt, once a court makes a finding that a specific 
item is marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared 
equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, 
memorialized inadequate findings, require otherwise. (Citations 
omitted). 
At the bottom of page 11 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel next resorts to the 
sentence: 
Unless the parties' separate contributions are reimbursed from 
the proceeds before a division of the remaining marital property, 
one party would not receive his or her presumptive equal share 
of marital property or his separate contribution. (Emphasis 
added). 
With that statement, opposing counsel has once again improperly missed the point that 
the trial court here did not categorize the parties separate contributions as separate property 
and that there was no "remaining" marital property. It was all marital property. This is the 
crucial distinction between Hall and the case at bar, because in Hall it was determined that 
the wife's contribution to the parties' home was always separate property and never became 
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marital property,2 which is precisely the opposite of what happened in the present case. 
Accordingly, Hall does not stand for the proposition that the trial court was required to carve 
out the separate contributions before dividing the marital estate as urged by opposing counsel. 
In our case, the separate contributions lost their categorization as separate property. 
Finally, on the issue of the trial court's failure to honor the 50% presumption, at pages 
16 and 17 of Appellee's Brief opposing counsel lists ten possibilities as to what was in the 
trial court's mind. Each of the possibilities is discussed as follows: 
1. The marriage was of short duration. This argument completely ignores 
the fact that in their pre-marital agreement the parties agreed that they would jointly 
produce the bulk of the marital property which the trial court refused to divide equally. 
The argument also overlooks the trial court's correctly stated principle of law that the 
standard with respect to marriages of short duration comes into play where no children 
are born of the marriage. (See Add. C, p. 12). Here, the parties knew Margee was 
pregnant with Cheyanna before they married. 
2. Margee received major benefits from Chuck. Such fact was never 
mentioned by the trial court as a reason why Margee was not awarded 50% of the 
marital property. Furthermore, this argument completely ignores the fact that both 
parties received major benefits from each other as was contemplated by the pre-
marital agreement. While Chuck's Statement of Fact number 7 as to the pre-marital 
2
 See footnote 1 to the Hall opinion. 
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agreement between Margee and Chuck, and his Statement of Fact number 19 as to his 
contributions to the Park City Condo, infer that Margee did not discharge her part of 
the agreement, any such inference is incorrect. In the Memo Decision beginning with 
the last paragraph on page 15, the trial court wrote: 
The court fully believes and accepts as a principle of law as well 
as equity, that the work of each spouse is valuable to a marriage. 
What one does almost always enables the other party to do 
something else productive. Petitioner's work enabled the parties 
to have benefits such as insurance, free travel, and income to 
meet daily expenses. Petitioner's condo from before the 
marriage enabled the parties to rent their home during the 2002 
Olympics for $40,000, from which the parties bought vehicles 
and used otherwise for the marriage. Both parties, and the child, 
benefitted from petitioner's work. The parties took numerous 
(over one hundred) airline trips, at no cost, to the Dune property 
and elsewhere. Similarly, respondent's chosen field, where his 
schedule is his own, enabled petitioner to work while he 
remained with the child. His work enabled the parties to have a 
place to go in using the free-fly benefit of petitioner's work. 
(Add.C,p.l5). 
3. The parties are older and brought substantial property to the marriage. 
Again, this argument ignores the parties' pre-marital agreement. 
4. The parties clearly intended that their properties remain separate. 
Opposing counsel has failed to include all of what he contends the trial court 
"detailed." What the trial court wrote at page 14 of the Memo Decision is "The 
parties intended, and the court so finds, that their properties remained largely separate, 
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but not entirely/' (Emphasis added). (Add. C, p. 143). Accordingly, there is nothing 
in that statement that identifies any exceptional circumstance with respect to what the 
trial court determined was marital property, and there is no indication that this was an 
exceptional circumstance relied upon. 
5. The parties kept separate accounts and no joint accounts. Surely that 
fact does not constitute an exceptional circumstance to justify the trial court's failure 
to equally divide over $800,000 of marital property, and there is no indication that the 
trial court treated it as such. 
6. Chuck had no intention to co-mingle his separate property. This 
argument is totally meaningless, because in spite of Chuck's intent with respect to co-
mingling his assets into the Marital Home, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, the 
trial court still determined that such of Chuck's separate property became marital 
property. The fact that he did what he did with his fingers crossed is of no 
consequence, and the trial court did not identify this fact as an exceptional 
circumstance. 
7. Chuck had no separate retirement and his premarital savings constituted 
his entire estate. This argument, apparently referring without any citation to Chuck's 
pre-marital status, completely overlooks the fact that Chuck's post-divorce status 
shows him to be very financially secure even if Margee is awarded 50% of the marital 
3
 This same language is in the conclusions at Add. B, p. 13. 
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property. In any event, there is no indication in the record that the trial court 
considered this an exceptional circumstance so as to justify the trial court's failure to 
award Margee 50% of the marital property. 
8. The marriage was the parties' first and a occurred later in life. This 
argument is really a repeat of argument number 3 above. The extraneous material 
presented with respect to the possibility of Chuck having other children was never 
mentioned by the trial court as a basis for any decision the trial court made, and such 
certainly did not serve as an exceptional circumstance relied upon by the trial court to 
justify the trial court's failure to divide the marital property equally. 
9. The Park City Condo was Margee's only Utah residence. Opposing 
counsel has failed to cite any portion of the record indicating that this was a factor at 
all in the trial court's decision. We fail to understand how this fact is of any 
significance at all. 
10. Margee's needs were met. The same could be said of Chuck's needs. 
Again, opposing counsel has failed to cite any portion of the record indicating that this 
was an exceptional circumstance relied upon by the trial court. 
What we are left with is that the only analysis for doing what the trial court did is the 
irrational basis stated in paragraph 17 of the conclusions. Rather than repeat that argument 
here, see the material beginning with the second foil paragraph on page 20 through the end 
of the first paragraph on page 21 of our opening brief. 
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In summary, the 50% presumption is the law in Utah. Although it is a rebuttable 
presumption, it is not to be ignored cavalierly. Our law requires the existence of exceptional 
circumstances to rebut the presumption. In its conclusions the trial court acknowledged the 
existence of the presumption, yet nowhere does it acknowledge that the presumption can only 
be rebutted by circumstances that are exceptional. Furthermore, nowhere does the trial court 
provide us with any meaningful disclosure of the steps he took to reach the ultimate 
conclusion that Margee was not entitled to 50% of the parties' marital properties. 
Accordingly, the parties marital properties must be distributed on a 50-50 basis. 
B. The district court abused its discretion by failing to award Margee a just 
and equitable share of the marital property. 
Beginning with the last full paragraph on page 9 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel 
argues that Chuck ended up with $200,000 less cash than when he came to the marriage, 
while Margee got $9,550 more cash as a result of the court's treatment of the Park City 
Condo. First it should be noted that as of the date of the marriage, Margee did not have 
$60,000 cash from the sale of her Chicago condo. That sale took place after the marriage. 
(App. A, f 41). It should also be noted that nowhere does opposing counsel quarrel with the 
our rendering of what the trial court awarded to both Chuck and Margee as provided in the 
tables on pages 18 and 19 of our opening brief. Instead, opposing counsel comes up with the 
incredible statement in the first full paragraph on page 10 of Appellee's Brief that "A fair 
comparison of the parties' circumstances thus reveals that Chuck's pre-marital net worth 
declined by $200,000, while Margee's increased by $9,550." Such assertion is made in the 
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face of the fact that the charts referred to show that by virtue of the trial court's treatment of 
the parties' properties, Chuck's net worth increased by nearly $650,000 while Margee's net 
worth increased by approximately $75,000. Opposing counsel's argument is proof of the old 
adage that you can only cast aspersions on an argument by improperly trying to prove it. 
POINT II. EVEN USING THE "BACK OUT" METHOD OF AWARDING THE 
PARTIES' ASSETS, THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE MARGEE CREDIT FOR HER 
$135,000 EQUITY IN THE PARK CITY CONDO AT THE TIME OF 
MARRIAGE, AND MARGEE SHOULD ONLY BE CHARGED WITH 
HER PRO-RATA SHARE OF ANY DEFICIT IN THE MARITAL 
EQUITY. 
At page 13 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel argues that there is no marital estate 
to divide. That is so only if Margee has no additional marital property because of the trial 
court's failure to honor the 50% presumption in favor of Margee. Such failure further 
resulted in an unfair result to Margee by the trial court assigning a full 50% share of the 
$18,400 deficit in the marital estate as distributed by the trial court. See Point II of our 
opening brief at page 26. 
At the bottom of page 13 of the Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel also argues that 
Margee received more than she was entitled to receive by virtue of the way the trial court 
treated distribution of the Park City Condo. This is a straw-man argument because Margee 
readily concedes that the Park City Condo was marital property, to be included with all other 
marital property, all of which marital property was then to be divided on a 50-50 basis. 
Opposing counsel's argument that somehow Margee ended up better off as a result of what 
the trial court did, only makes sense if the trial court were permitted to handle the Park City 
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Condo differently and apart from all of the other marital property. The bottom chart on 
page 37 of our opening brief, demonstrates that the $263,000 Account, Kate Road and the 
Park City Condo should all be treated as marital properties and fairly allocated with all other 
marital properties, along with Margee's share of the appreciated value of the Dune Road 
assets as stated in such chart. Opposing counsel's argument wants us to believe that the trial 
court did Margee a favor by not treating the Park City Condo as marital property. How can 
such contention be taken seriously? 
Based on what is written on page 23 of the Appellee's Brief, it also appears that 
opposing counsel misunderstands Margee' s position. Margee' s position is that the Park City 
Condo is marital property and should be treated the same as the Marital Home, the $263,000 
Account and Kate Road. However, the trial court did not recognize the 50% presumption in 
favor of Margee. Margee's argument then becomes two-fold: 
(1) It was error to fail to award each of the parties their 50% portions of all of the 
marital property; or 
(2) Even if one resorts to the back-out method of distribution used by the trial 
court, then Margee must be given credit for her $ 135,000 contribution to the Park City Condo 
to the same extent the trial court gave Chuck credit for his $55,000 contribution to the Park 
City Condo, since both contributions were made to such marital property within a month of 
each other. 
Contrary to opposing counsel's argument on page 25 of Appellee's Brief, the trial 
court valued the Park City Condo at both the date of marriage and the date of trial. What the 
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trial court did not do was give Margee credit for the full amount of her contributions to the 
marital properties to the same extent that he gave Chuck credit for his contributions. We 
emphasize again that Margee' s and Chuck's contributions to such marital property were made 
within one month of each other. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
AWARD MARGEE ANY SHARE OF THE APPRECIATED VALUE OF 
DUNE ROAD AND ITS RENTAL INCOME. 
A. The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding 
that Margee is not the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road. 
In Argument II, beginning on page 18 of Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel contends 
that Margee is not entitled to 50% of the enhanced value of the Dune Road assets. 
First, it is important to make clear that Margee does not contend she is entitled to any of the 
value of Dune Road that had accrued prior to the parties' marriage.4 There is no question that 
Chuck alone is entitled to that $600,000 value. However, in an effort to defeat Margee's 
entitlement to 50% of the post-marriage appreciated value, opposing counsel states at the 
bottom of page 19 that "Petitioner also asserts without reference to the record that Chuck 
could not have built the Aerie home without selling 50% of Dune Road." 
That argument completely overlooks the marshalled and controverting facts listed 
beginning with the last paragraph at the bottom of page 29 and continuing through the end 
of the first paragraph at the top of page 32 of our opening brief. Furthermore, opposing 
4
 Opposing counsel incorrectly assumes otherwise in his argument on page 12 of 
Appellee's Brief. 
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counsel's statement that Petitioner's assertion was "without reference" ignores the reference 
to Add. D, p. 238 from the transcript of the trial proceedings wherein Chuck is recorded as 
having testified as follows: 
Q. Had you not sold at least half of Dune Road, would you 
have been able to build the Aerie Road property as you 
did? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. My question to you is your testimony different today than it was then? 
A. Very little different. I — there might have been some other options, but 
I certainly agree with that option. 
Consequently, what opposing counsel characterizes as "Petitioner speculates" is fully 
supported by the record. 
Everyone understands that the rule with respect to separate pre-marital property is that 
the court should generally award such property to the spouse bringing the property to the 
marriage, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless the other spouse 
has enhanced, augmented, maintained, preserved or protected such separate property. See 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1998) and Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 
1320, (Utah App. 1990). 
In the face of that case law, Chuck relies heavily on the notion that in 1999 he had 
options as to what he could have done with Dune Road, including borrowing against it and 
selling it. However, opposing counsel fails to come to grips with Chuck's uncontro verted 
admission that neither of such options was realistic, particularly in light of the fact that he 
could not sell Dune Road for his asking price during the crucial time in 1999, and further in 
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light of the fact that the sale of the one-half interest to Margee's mother was most 
advantageous to him and his preferred option. (Add. D, pp. 235-238, 411). 
Nothing opposing counsel has said defeats the proposition that by Margee convincing 
her mother to buy 50% of Dune Road, Margee enabled Chuck to keep 50% of Dune Road. 
Our case law says that if Margee enhanced, augmented, maintained, preserved or protected 
Chuck's separate property, then Margee is entitled to a share of the enhanced value of that 
property. While neither Chuck nor Margee was responsible for the post-marriage increased 
value of Dune Road, Margee was responsible for the fact that Chuck got to keep his one-half 
interest in Dune Road. 
In an attempt to minimize Margee's contributions, at the top of page 20 of the 
Appellee's Brief, opposing counsel writes: 
Petitioner's sole claim appears to be based upon the fact that she 
suggested her parents purchase a one-half interest in the Dune 
Road property, which allowed Chuck Hayes sufficient cash 
assets to complete the home in Park City, Utah and to maintain 
his remaining one-half separate interest. Petitioner speculates 
that had she not suggested her parents buy Chuck's one-half 
interest, he could not have raised the financing necessary to 
complete the Aerie home, nor would he be in a position to reap 
the benefits of the substantial appreciation his one-half interest 
in Dune Road experienced after the sale. (Emphasis added). 
In the paragraph beginning at the bottom of the page 20, opposing counsel further writes: 
The most that can be attributed to Petitioner's "suggestion" is 
that a substantial benefit inured to her parents, who were 
allowed to purchase a fifty percent interest in the property that 
Chuck Hayes had worked on, litigated over, rebuilt and 
renovated throughout a period of twenty-three years prior to the 
parties' marriage. (Emphasis added). 
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Nowhere in the record is there evidence that what Margee did was a mere "suggestion." To 
the contrary, the trial court found that Margee encouraged such sale, and Margee's 
uncontroverted testimony is that she "begged" her mother to buy the one-half interest Chuck 
was willing to sell in order make good on his obligation to provide the marital home. (App. 
A, 1f 44; App. D, p. 155). 
In the final analysis, there is the overwhelming evidence as recited in our opening brief 
that Margee was the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road, and consequently 
Margee is the reason why Chuck was able to enjoy a tremendous appreciation of the value 
of his retained part of Dune Road. Consequently, the trial court's finding of fact that Margee 
was not the reason that Chuck did not sell all or part of any of Dune Road is simply contrary 
to the evidence. 
In summary, the increased value of Dune Road resulted from market forces from 
which Chuck would not have been able to reap any benefit, had Margee not made it possible 
for Chuck to keep his one-half interest in Dune Road. 
B, The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding 
that in the future Margee will benefit greatly from Dune Road. 
In its Memo Decision, the trial court clearly relied heavily on the notion that in the 
future Margee would "benefit greatly" from her mother's one-half interest in Dune Road. 
The trial court later stated that what the trial court had written in the Memo Decision was not 
all that determinative of its ultimate decision on that issue. 
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However, nothing opposing counsel has written demonstrates that at the time of the 
divorce, Margee would "benefit greatly" from Dune Road. The evidence remains 
uncontro verted that Margee would not inherit any of Dune Road. Any notion that Margee 
would benefit greatly in the future because in the past Margee used Dune Road along with 
Chuck and Cheyenna, surely is not sufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, Margee repeats her request that the Court issue one of two 
alternative orders in favor of Margee as detailed in our opening brief. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2006. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK& McDONOUGH, P.C. 
By L(^~~~-~ ^ 
Kent B Linebaugh 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of April, 2006 I caused to be sent, via hand-
delivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
to the following: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
170 South Main Street 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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